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We Can Do Better: Anti-Homeless
Ordinances as Violations of State
Substantive Due Process Law
"How does it feel
To be without a home
Like a complete unknown
Like a rolling stone?"
-Bob Dylan 1
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INTRODUCTION

In September of 2004, a group of local business owners and
professionals in Nashville, Tennessee, together with the Nashville
Downtown Partnership, a local downtown improvement organization,
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submitted a plan to the Metro Council 2 that proposed making it illegal
to panhandle in the busiest areas of the city.3 Advocates of the
proposed legislation argued that panhandlers "harass tourists and
customers and make the city less appealing." 4 Opponents viewed the
proposal as nothing more than an attempt to force the homeless out of
the city. 5 The Nashville plan is patterned after the measures that
several major American cities-including Philadelphia, Denver, and
Seattle-have adopted in an attempt to deal with the epidemic of
6
homelessness that has swept the nation in recent years.
Homelessness was first recognized as a significant social
problem in the United States in the 1980s. 7 Though the problem has
since become increasingly prominent in the public eye, Congress has
done surprisingly little to ameliorate its effects. To date, the only
major piece of federal legislation that has attempted to address
homelessness is the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of
1987,8 which authorized a variety of services for the homeless,
including emergency shelter, transitional housing, job training,
primary health care, education, and some permanent housing. While
the McKinney Act was and remains landmark legislation concerning
the plight of the homeless, red tape, budget cuts, and the magnitude of
the homeless problem have hampered its efficacy in addressing
homelessness. 9
In the absence of effective federal legislation, state and city
governments have been left largely to their own devices to manage the
problems posed by local homeless populations.
Many local
governments have responded to the problems caused by homelessness
by criminalizing certain conduct commonly associated with

2.
The Metropolitan Council serves as the legislative body for both Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee. Metro Council Home Page, http://www.nashville.org/council (last visited May
31, 2006).
3.
Holly Edwards, Plan to Outlaw Beggars Draws Strong Reaction, THE TENNESSEAN,
Sept. 2, 2004, at 1A.
4.
Id.
5.
See id. ("Nashville has got an overpopulation of homeless people, and the business
people and the mayor are trying to force us out.").
6.
See id. (explaining that the plan was modeled after anti-panhandling laws in
Philadelphia, Denver, Seattle, and Chattanooga).
7.

8.
9.

JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., BESIDE THE GOLDEN DOOR 1 (1998).

42 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11472 (2006).
See generally NATIONAL

MCKINNEY/VENTO
ACT
cations/facts/McKinney.pdf.

COALITION

(2006),

FOR THE

available

at

HOMELESS,

NCH FACT

SHEET #18,

http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publi
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homelessness, such as begging, 10 sleeping or camping in public,11 and
loitering. 12
Expanding the scope of the criminal law in this way and
placing the homeless in jail is certainly one way of addressing
homelessness. However, while such a solution will likely please
tourists, merchants, and others who are made uncomfortable by the
mere presence of the homeless, this approach does nothing to address
the causes of homelessness or prevent the homeless from returning to
the streets once they are released from jail. If the intent of local
governments is to find a permanent solution to the problem--one that
helps individuals overcome the circumstances that have led to their
homelessness and sets them on a path toward becoming productive
members of society-then criminalizing conduct that is unavoidable
for the homeless is futile.
This Note argues that criminalizing acts commonly associated
with homelessness is an ineffective solution to the problem of
homelessness. This Note further argues that courts should strike
down laws that essentially criminalize the status of homelessness as
violations of state constitutional due process guarantees. A brief
history of the types of legal challenges that have been brought against
state and local laws targeting the homeless will be presented in Part
II. Part III explains why future challenges to these laws brought
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the federal Constitution are unlikely to be successful.
Part IV then argues that due process challenges under state
constitutions are far more likely to succeed. This Note will conclude in
Part V by highlighting cities that are creatively working to reduce
their problems with the homeless and by encouraging advocates for
the homeless to work toward the repeal or invalidation of "antihomeless" laws and urging local governments to develop more creative
and effective solutions to the problem.

10. See, e.g., ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., CODE § 204-24(B)(1) (2006) (prohibiting begging in
public).
11. See, e.g., DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 31-13(a) (2006) (prohibiting sleeping in a public place).
12. See, e.g., INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 407-103 (2006) (prohibiting loitering, with
exceptions).
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II.BACKGROUND

A. Who is Homeless and Why?
An accurate count of the homeless population in America and
analysis of its demographic information are difficult to attain, as the
13
homeless are not easy to include in official population counts.
Despite this difficulty, researchers in recent years have performed
studies that have yielded general information about the age, gender,
families, and employment status of America's homeless.
Estimates place the size of the homeless population in America
between 200,000 and 600,000.14 One study estimates the average age
of a homeless individual to be thirty five, 15 and most studies show that
unmarried homeless adults are more likely to be male than female. In
2001, a U.S. Conference of Mayors survey found that single men
comprised 41 percent of the urban homeless population and single
women comprised 14 percent.1 6 Another study showed that children
under the age of eighteen accounted for 39 percent of the homeless
population in 2003.17
The U.S. Conference of Mayors further
determined that the racial and ethnic composition of the American
homeless population was 49 percent African-American, 35 percent
Caucasian, 13 percent Hispanic, 2 percent Native American, and 1
percent Asian.1 8
Families with children are among the fastest growing segments
of the homeless population. In a 2004 survey, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors found that families comprised 40 percent of the homeless
population,
a
significant
increase
from
previous
years. 19
Unaccompanied minors were found to compose roughly 5 percent of
20
the urban homeless population.

13.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION,

POVERTY FACT SHEET SERIES: POVERTY

AMONG THE HOMELESS, available at http://ohioline.osu.edu/hyg-fact/5000/5711.html (listing
several reasons why the homeless are difficult to count, including the temporary nature of
homelessness, their ability to blend in with non-homeless people, and the fact that the homeless
often do not tell the truth about their homeless status).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16.

NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, FACT SHEET, WHO IS HOMELESS?

available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/Whois.pdf.
17. Id.
18.

Id.

19.
20.

Id.
Id.

(2004),
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Research has also yielded some information regarding the
education
level and employment
status of the homeless.
Approximately 40-50 percent of homeless individuals are believed to
have at least a high school education. 21 Somewhat surprisingly, an
estimated 17 percent of the urban homeless population is employed in
some manner. 2 2 Studies have also discovered that the rate of
homelessness among military veterans is disproportionately high,
with approximately 40 percent of homeless men having served in the
armed forces. 23 The Conference of Mayors survey found that 10
percent of the overall urban homeless population consisted of
veterans. 24
While there are almost limitless reasons why an individual
may become homeless, in reality, most people become homeless for one
of only a handful of reasons. Homelessness is most commonly a
consequence of unemployment, low wages, rising housing costs, or any
combination thereof. For individuals faced with such circumstances,
an inability to make rent or mortgage payments often results in
eviction or foreclosure. 25 Moreover, declining wages have put housing
altogether out of reach for many workers. In every state in the nation,
the average employee working forty hours per week at the local
minimum wage cannot afford a two-bedroom apartment at Fair
Market Rent. 26 In fact, in forty-six of the fifty-two U.S. jurisdictions
(including Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia), the Housing
Wage 27 is more than double the federal minimum wage, 28 meaning
that an employee earning the federal minimum wage would have to
work over eighty hours each week for fifty-two weeks each year in

21. THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION, supra note 13.
22. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 16. In a number of areas not
surveyed by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the percentage is even higher. Id.
23. Id. By contrast, just 34% of the general population has served in the armed forces.
24. Id.
25. See THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION, supra note 13 (noting that unemployment
and lack of money are two of the primary reasons individuals become homeless).
26.

See NATIONAL Low INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT OF REACH 2005, available at

http://www.nlihc.org/oor2005/minjobsmap.pdf (displaying the "[n]umber of jobs (40 hours per
week, 52 weeks a year) per household at prevailing minimum wage that are needed to afford the
Fair Market Rent for a two-bedroom unit at 30% of income"). "Fair Market Rents" are the
monthly amounts "needed to rent privately owned, decent, safe, and sanitary rental housing of a
modest (nonluxury) nature with suitable amenities." NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS,
supra note 16. Fair Market Rents are established by the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development for cities in all 50 states. Id.
27. The Housing Wage represents the hourly wage that a household must earn in order to
afford the Fair Market Rent for a two-bedroom unit at 30% of income. See NATIONAL Low
INCOME HOUSING COALITION, supra note 26.

28.

The current federal minimum wage is $5.15 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006).
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order to afford a two-bedroom apartment at 30 percent of his or her
29
income-the federal definition of affordable housing.
Substance abuse and mental illness are other common causes
of homelessness. Substance abusers comprise approximately onethird of the total homeless population, 30 and a survey recently found
that approximately 23 percent of the single adult homeless population
31
suffers from some form of severe and persistent mental illness.
Habitual substance abusers tend to become homeless when they spend
their money supporting addictions rather than on necessities, such as
housing.
Mental illnesses often render people either entirely
unemployable or relegate them to very low paying jobs. Without
friends, family, or government assistance to help them, substance
abusers and the mentally ill are often forced to live on the streets.
Among women, domestic violence is also a significant factor
contributing to homelessness. Poor and battered women are often
forced to choose between abusive relationships and living on the
streets. In a study of 777 homeless parents (mostly women) in ten
U.S. cities, 22 percent reported that domestic violence played a role in
their decision to leave their last residence. 32 In addition, 44 percent of
cities surveyed in another study identified domestic violence as a
primary cause of homelessness.3 3 The problem appears to be even
more serious nationally, with approximately half of all homeless
women
and children
reportedly
fleeing abusive
domestic
34
arrangements.
The statistics on homelessness are somewhat surprising. The
numbers seem to indicate that most homeless individuals are not
drunk or lazy bums who essentially "choose" to be homeless-the type
of people for whom many Americans have little sympathy. In fact,
35
homelessness is a temporary condition for most individuals.
Insufficient wages, a lack of affordable housing, addiction, mental
illness, and domestic abuse are all factors that contribute to the
existence and growth of the American homeless population. Revising
the stereotype of the typical homeless individual to reflect the true

29.

NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 16.

30. See id. (noting that there is no generally accepted figure for the number of homeless
with substance abuse problems, but estimating the percentage to be around thirty percent).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34.
35.

Id.
See UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY 42

(2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/hungersurvey/2005HH2005FINAL.pdf
("People remain homeless for an average of 7 months in the survey cities.").
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causes of homelessness could go a long way toward ending the
mistreatment of the homeless in the United States.
B. Challenges to the TraditionalTreatment of the Homeless in the
American Legal System
The U.S. political and legal systems have historically treated
the homeless as outcasts. Actions traditionally associated with
homelessness, such as vagrancy and begging, have been regulated or
prohibited for centuries. 36 The Articles of Confederation went so far as
to specifically exclude paupers from the privileges and immunities
guaranteed to other citizens, 37 and in 1837, the Supreme Court
referred to homeless individuals in a published opinion as morally
pestilent. 38
Admittedly, the homeless are not quite as overtly
denigrated in contemporary society. Nonetheless, "anti-homeless"
laws are still alive and well.
Today, the laws most commonly targeted at the homeless
prohibit or restrict loitering, sleeping in public, and begging. 39 For
years, these laws went unchallenged. Two explanations offered for the
lack of legal challenges are (1) that the individuals most affected by
the laws were unable to afford legal counsel, and (2) that police more
often used the laws to disperse violators than to arrest them, leaving
relatively few adjudications to be challenged. 40 In recent years,
however, the homeless population has grown, as has public
dissatisfaction with the desire of local governments to push the

36. See Juliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for
Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 301 (1996) (noting that
vagrancy was criminalized in England in the 14th century); Young v. New York City Transit
Authority, 729 F. Supp. 341, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d
Cir. 1990) ("begging has been regulated, monitored and at times prohibited throughout history").
37. Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and HistoricalAnalysis of Official
Efforts to Drive Homeless PersonsFrom American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 639 (1992).
38. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 142 (1837) (stating that it is "necessary for
a state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds
and... convicts").

39. Out of the forty-nine cities surveyed in the 2001 report of the National Law Center on
Poverty and Homelessness, one-third prohibited sitting or lying down in certain public places
and all forty-nine had some kind of public space restriction besides anti-begging laws. See
NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, COMBATING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS:
A GUIDE TO UNDERSTAND AND PREVENT LEGISLATION THAT CRIMINALIZES LIFE-SUSTAINING

ACTIVITIES 3 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.nlchp.org/FA.CivilRights/CR_ crimbooklet.pdf
[hereinafter COMBATING THE CRIMINALIZATION].
40. See Smith, supra note 36, at 321 n.168 (stating that arrests of the homeless often fall
short of final adjudication); C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(speculating that the lack of cases addressing the rights of the homeless is a result of homeless
individuals "not having the ability or wherewithal to pursue the challenge").
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problem out of the public view. This dissatisfaction has inspired a
number of challenges against laws that target conduct primarily
engaged in by the homeless.
Legal challenges have been brought against two distinct types
of anti-homeless laws: those that try to keep the homeless out of public
areas and those aimed at preventing the homeless from asking
passers-by for money or food ("panhandling"). Challenges to both of
these types of laws have been brought under multiple legal theories.
The majority of these challenges, however, have been unsuccessful,
signaling the need for new legal strategies if the laws are to be
overturned in favor of more progressive methods of reducing the
homeless population.
1. Attacks on Laws Seeking to Keep the Homeless out of Public Areas
The first category of laws that advocates for the homeless have
challenged are those that attempt to keep the homeless out of public
areas. Many cities that have sought to keep the homeless out of hightraffic public areas first enacted ordinances that prohibited vagrancy
41
and then amended those laws to restrict sleeping in public.
Vagrancy laws were widespread in the United States until 1972.42
The laws were originally intended to punish those who were physically
able to work yet chose not to do so, remaining idle with no apparent
means of support. 4 3 Today's versions of these laws, however, are
generally justified on different grounds, usually a city's interest in
44
sanitation, aesthetics, or protection of public safety.
Challenges to laws regulating vagrancy and sleeping in public
have been brought on a number of different grounds, including
allegations that the laws are unconstitutionally vague, constitute
cruel and unusual punishment, violate equal protection, and infringe
upon the fundamental right to travel. Additionally, some suggest that
the homeless might successfully defend against a prosecution for a
violation of these types of laws by asserting that the conduct in

41. See, e.g., DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 31-13(a) (2006) (prohibiting sleeping in a public place).
42. See Smith, supra note 36, at 302 (noting that vagrancy laws in the United States can be
traced to colonial times and that by 1960 nearly every state in the nation had passed a law
outlawing vagrancy).
43. See Dominguez v. Denver, 363 P.2d 661, 662 (Colo. 1961) (citing a Colorado statute
defining a vagrant as "any person able to work and support himself in some honest and
respectable calling, who shall be found loitering or strolling about"), overruled by Arnold v.
Denver, 464 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1971).
44. See Portland v. Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the anticamping ordinance at issue was passed by the City Council in response to "unsafe and
unsanitary living situations which pose a threat to the peace, health and safety" of citizens).
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question was justified or necessary to avoid a greater societal harm.
The strengths and weaknesses of many of these challenges to
vagrancy and sleeping in public laws will be examined below.
a. UnconstitutionalVagueness
By the 1960s, nearly every state in the nation had passed a
statute prohibiting vagrancy in some way. 45 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court sounded the death knell for vagrancy laws in
Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,46 when it struck down a statute
that defined "vagrants" as "rogues and vagabonds," "dissolute persons
who go about begging," and "persons wandering or strolling around
from place to place without any lawful purpose or object." 47 In
Papachristou, the Court held that the vagrancy statute at issue
violated the Due Process Clause 48 because it was unconstitutionally
vague. Finding it unclear exactly which types of conduct made one a
"vagrant" under the statute, the Court held that the law violated a
fundamental principle of due process, since the statute failed to make
it clear to the average person whether "his contemplated conduct is
49
forbidden by the statute."
In response to Papachristou,local governments passed laws
that simply prohibited loitering. 50 The Supreme Court, however,
found loitering statutes similarly vague and unconstitutional in
Kolender v. Lawson.5 1 In Kolender, the Court deemed a loitering
statute unconstitutionally vague that required individuals who
wandered the streets to provide "credible and reliable" identification
and to account for their purpose when asked by a police officer. 52 The
Court held that such requirements failed to establish minimal
guidelines for law enforcement officers to follow in enforcing the

45. See Simon, supra note 37, at 639 n.55.
46. 405 U.S. 156, 158 (1972).
47. Id. at 156 n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE §§ 26-57).
48. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)).
50. See Smith, supra note 36, at 303 ("Once Papachristou largely invalidated vagrancy
laws, localities increasingly relied on loitering laws to control transient populations."). Loitering
laws typically "permit the arrest of individuals whose apparent and unexplained aimlessness
engenders the suspicion that they are about to commit a crime." Paul Ades, The
Unconstitutionalityof "Antihomeless" Law: Ordinances ProhibitingSleeping in Outdoor Public
Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595, 604 n.70 (1989).
51. 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983).
52. Id. at 353 n.1.
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statute and therefore denied individuals due process. 53
Since
Kolender, however, local laws prohibiting loitering have typically been
rewritten to provide more specific guidelines for police enforcement.
These more narrowly tailored laws have generally withstood
54
challenges for vagueness.
b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Perhaps the strongest argument to date against laws banning
sleeping in public takes the position that such laws punish individuals
for a status, rather than an act, in violation of the Eighth
55
Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments.
This argument stems from the Supreme Court's holding in Robinson v.
California.56 In Robinson, the plaintiff challenged his conviction
under a California statute that made it a crime to "be addicted to the
use of narcotics." 57 The Court compared the statute at issue to laws
that made it a criminal offense "for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease,"5 8 and held that such
laws "would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment." 59 Robinson thus established that a
criminal law that punishes a mere status without requiring an
affirmative act is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
60
Fourteenth Amendment.
A few years after Robinson, in Powell v. Texas, 61 the Supreme
Court was asked to extend the Robinson doctrine and reverse the
conviction of a man who had been convicted under a statute
prohibiting public drunkenness. The petitioner presented evidence
that he was a chronic alcoholic who had no control over his compulsion
to become drunk in public. 62 There was no majority opinion, but the
53. Id. at 358 ("[Ihe statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to
determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute.").
54. See, e.g., United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 877 (4th Cir. 1970) (upholding
regulation banning loitering on government property).
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
56. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
57.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 2006).

58. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 667. The Court held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment, rather
than the Eighth Amendment, since the Fourteenth Amendment had previously been held to
incorporate the Eighth Amendment. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 614 (1978) (stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment).
61. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
62. Id. at 517-20.
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Court refused to reverse the conviction under Robinson.63 Justice
White's concurrence, however, did strongly suggest that if the
petitioner had been homeless, he would have voted with the dissent to
64
overturn the conviction.
Recently, in at least four cases, lower courts have considered
challenges to anti-sleeping ordinances under the Robinson doctrine.
The outcomes of these challenges have varied. In Pottinger v. City of
Miami,65 a district court in Florida granted injunctive relief to a class
of homeless plaintiffs, holding that Robinson prohibited punishing the
homeless for innocent acts such as sleeping and eating in public.6 6 By
contrast, in Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco,67 a California
court held that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on
the merits by relying on Robinson for the proposition that individuals
68
could not be punished for acts resulting from their homeless status.
Two additional courts held that ordinances forbidding the homeless
from sleeping in public were unconstitutional under Robinson, but
both decisions were reversed on other grounds on appeal. 69
While a compelling argument can be made that anti-sleeping
laws punish the status of homelessness in violation of Robinson, the
argument has so far found limited success in court. Its likelihood of
success in the future cases is therefore questionable.
c. UnconstitutionalInterference with the Right to Travel
Opponents have advanced a third argument against antisleeping laws, alleging that such laws violate the constitutional right

63. Id. at 537, 548, 554.
64.
For all practical purposes the public streets may be home for [some chronic
alcoholics] ....
For some of these alcoholics I would think a showing could be made
that resisting drunkenness is impossible and that avoiding public places when
intoxicated is also impossible. As applied to them this statute is in effect a law which
bans a single act for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth Amendmentthe act of getting drunk.
Id. at 551 (White, J., concurring).
65.

810 F. Supp. 1551, 1584 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

66. Id. at 1565 ("As long as the homeless plaintiffs do not have a single place where they
can lawfully be, the challenged ordinances, as applied to them, effectively punish them for
something for which they may not be convicted under the eighth amendment-sleeping, eating
and other innocent conduct.").
67. 846 F. Supp. 843, 856 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
68. Id. at 858.
69. Johnson v. Dallas, 860 F. Supp. 344, 350 (N.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd and vacated for lack of
standing,61 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); Tobe v. Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 393 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994), rev'd, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995) (refusing to consider an "as applied" challenge and
considering only a facial challenge).
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This argument contends (1) that laws prohibiting
to travel. 70
homeless individuals from lying down, sleeping, or performing other
harmless, life-sustaining activities penalize them for migrating to
places where such laws have been enacted and (2) that such a penalty
on migration amounts to a violation of the right to travel. 7 1 Since the
right to travel is considered a fundamental right, 72 any infringement
upon the right must serve a compelling state interest and use the least
73
restrictive means possible.
Lower courts at both the state and federal levels have accepted
the right to travel argument in finding anti-sleeping laws
unconstitutional. 74 In Pottinger,for instance, the court found that "the
City's enforcement of laws that prevent homeless individuals who
have no place to go from sleeping, lying down, eating and performing
other harmless life-sustaining activities burdens their right to
travel." 75 The court went on to find that the burden was not justified
by a compelling state interest and did not represent the least
restrictive means of achieving the city's interests. 76 In Tobe v. City of
Santa Ana, the court held that a law prohibiting the homeless from
sleeping in public was "a blatant and unconstitutional infringement on
the right to travel."77 Unfortunately for the homeless, the right to
travel argument has yet to be upheld on appeal at either the state or
federal level, 78 thus undermining its precedential value in homeless'
rights cases.

70. The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to travel. See, e.g., Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 48-49 (1868). The Court has not made clear, however, from which specific
constitutional provision this right to travel was derived. Professor Thomas McCoy makes a
compelling argument that right to travel cases are essentially Equal Protection cases in which
established residents of a state are discriminating against "newcomers" to that state. Thomas R.
McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions - Fundamental Right to Travel or 'Newcomers' as a
Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 1021 (1975).
71. See Pottinger, 810 F.Supp. at 1580 (noting that many courts "have found that laws
infringe on the right to travel where their primary purpose is to impede migration").
72. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("The constitutional right to
travel ... occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that
has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.").
73. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain fundamental rights are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
compelling state interest, and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate interests at stake.") (quotation marks and citations omitted).
74. See Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1554; Tobe, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392.
75. Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1580.
76. Id. at 1583.
77. Tobe, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d at 393.
78. The city did not appeal the result in Pottinger, and the Tobe decision was later
overturned by the California Supreme Court on grounds unrelated to the right to travel claim.
See Tobe v. Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal. 1995).

1426

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4:1413

d. Necessity Defense
Advocates for the homeless have also suggested that the
homeless could use the affirmative defense of necessity to defend
against a charge of violating an anti-sleeping statute. 79 The necessity
defense reflects society's general belief that a criminal act should not
be punished if it is undertaken to prevent a greater harm.8 0 One
scholar suggests that a homeless defendant might successfully argue
that violating an anti-sleeping ordinance is necessary to avoid the
greater evil of trespassing on private property.8 1
The necessity
defense may only be raised by an individual being prosecuted for a
crime, however, and cannot be used to attack the legality of a statute.
As such, it would be futile to enlist this argument in any future
attempt to categorically strike down anti-sleeping statutes. Moreover,
it is only of limited usefulness even to individuals, since the homeless
are often arrested but rarely prosecuted for violating anti-sleeping
82
ordinances.
2. Attacks on Laws Regulating Panhandling
Many cities have passed ordinances prohibiting or regulating
panhandling. Cities that regulate this practice purportedly do so in
order to protect their citizens from what they perceive to be a nuisance
or potentially dangerous behavior.8 3 Advocates for the homeless,
however, have brought a number of legal challenges against antipanhandling laws, alleging that these laws violate the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech, are unconstitutionally vague,
amount to an unreasonable exercise of police power, and/or violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.8 4 As with challenges to
laws prohibiting vagrancy and sleeping in public, challenges to antipanhandling statutes have had only limited success.

79. See Donald E. Baker, Comment, "Anti-Homeless"Legislation: UnconstitutionalEfforts to
Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 452-53 (1990).
80. See State v. Chisholm, 882 P.2d 974, 976 (Ct. App. Idaho 1994).
81. See Baker, supra note 79, at 453 (arguing that a woman arrested for sleeping in the
street has avoided the greater harm that could have resulted by her breaking into a building to
sleep).
82. See Smith, supra note 36, at 321 n.168.
83. See, e.g., People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting
that a state has a legitimate interest in protecting citizens from unwanted exposure to certain
types of expression that may properly be deemed a public nuisance).
84. Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Laws Regulating Begging, Panhandling, or Similar
Activity by Pooror Homeless Persons, 7 A.L.R.5th 455 (1992).
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a. Freedom of Speech
Perhaps the strongest constitutional claim levied against antipanhandling laws is the argument that the laws violate the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Courts are split at both the
federal and state levels, however, as to whether panhandling should
85
be protected under the First Amendment as a form of speech.
Courts have rejected First Amendment challenges on a number
of different grounds. At least one court has held that laws that
restrict panhandling do not implicate the First Amendment because
panhandling does not involve speech.8 6 Other courts have held that
laws restricting panhandling do not violate the First Amendment
because they are narrowly tailored and restrict only conduct that the
government has a legitimate interest in regulating, while permitting
all other forms of speech.8 7
A California court upheld antipanhandling laws on still other grounds, holding that the state had a
legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from certain unpleasant
methods of expression, such as begging, which might properly be
deemed a nuisance and which bore no necessary relationship to
freedom of speech.8 8 Finally, a New York court held that panhandling
is a form of speech, but that the government may rightfully restrict
panhandling in New York City's subway system, since the subway
system is a nonpublic forum, subject to reasonable restrictions on
89
speech imposed by the city government.

85. Compare Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), with
Loper v. New York Police Dept., 766 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); compare Ulmer v. Municipal
Court of Oakland-Piedmont Judicial Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263 (1st Dist. 1976), with Ledford v.
State, 652 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1995).
86. See Young, 903 F.2d at 154 (holding that the object of panhandling is the simple
transfer of money and that speech is not inherent to the act or essence of the conduct).
87. See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that restriction on
panhandling was reasonable in that it was limited "to only those certain times and places where
citizens naturally would feel most insecure about their surroundings"); Smith v. Fort
Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding a restriction on begging "narrowly
tailored to serve the City's interest in providing a safe, pleasant environment and eliminating
nuisance activity on the beach"); Roulette v. Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1449 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(finding a legitimate interest in keeping streets and sidewalks free of obstructions and thus
holding a pedestrian interference statute constitutional, despite its possible interference with
any expressive conduct involved in "the mere silent presence of an unkempt and disheveled
person sitting or lying on a sidewalk"); McFarlin v. District of Columbia, 681 A.2d 440, 449 (Dist.
Col. App. 1996) (holding that a restriction on begging at any subway station was a reasonable
regulation designed to ensure public safety in a nonpublic forum).
88. See People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
89. See People v. Schrader, 617 N.Y.S.2d 429, 437 (City Crim. Ct. 1994) (finding the city's
ban on begging in the subways reasonable).
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The courts that have ruled in favor of the homeless plaintiffs in
First Amendment challenges have done so for at least two reasons.
First, courts have held that certain restrictions on panhandling were
overly broad, since, in addition to regulating panhandling, the
restrictions regulated conduct that is undoubtedly protected by the
First Amendment. 90
Courts seem particularly receptive to this
argument where local governments have attempted to restrict
panhandling while carving out an exception for the solicitation of
donations for nonprofits or other charitable organizations. 91 Second,
at least two courts have also indicated that a government's interest in
protecting its citizens from the annoyance of panhandlers may not be
92
sufficient to support a ban on panhandling.
While several lower courts have been persuaded that the First
Amendment protects the right to panhandle, appellate courts have
been hesitant to follow suit. 93 Without binding precedent establishing
that panhandling is to be considered speech for First Amendment
purposes, courts remain free to deny panhandling any First
Amendment protection. As a result, the success of First Amendment
challenges to these laws may turn on subjective factors, such as the
political ideology of the particular court before which the challenge is
brought. Until there is precedent binding on trial courts establishing
that begging and panhandling are entitled to First Amendment
protection, the First Amendment is unlikely to provide an effective
means for attacking anti-panhandling laws.
90. See Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 802 F.Supp. 1029, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(invalidating a broad ban on begging that served to prohibit all the messages that begging sends
about society); Ledford v. State, 652 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that
speech was restricted in a manner more intrusive than necessary); C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d 47,
50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that a restriction on begging restricted the right to free
speech "in a more intrusive manner than necessary").
91. See Perry v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 121 F.3d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no
evidence that panhandlers were any more cumbersome upon fair competition or free traffic flow
than organizations with nonprofit status); Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (N.D. Cal.
1991) (finding no distinction of a constitutional dimension between soliciting funds for oneself
and for charities).
92. See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324 (describing the interest in avoiding annoyance to the
public as "hardly compelling"); C.C.B., 458 So. 2d at 50 ("Protecting citizens from mere
annoyance is not a sufficient compelling reason to absolutely deprive one of a first amendment
right.").
93. The Second Circuit appears to be the only circuit to have held that begging is protected
by the First Amendment. See Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir.
1993) ("It cannot be gainsaid that begging implicates expressive conduct or communicative
activity."). Several lower federal courts, however, have also held that begging has an expressive
component and is therefore entitled to First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Blair, 775 F. Supp.
at 1322 ("A request for alms clearly conveys information regarding the speaker's plight. Begging
gives the speaker an opportunity to spread his views and ideas on, among other things, the way
our society treats its poor and disenfranchised.").
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b. UnconstitutionalVagueness
A second type of challenge to laws outlawing panhandling has
been a due process challenge alleging that the laws are
unconstitutionally vague in that they fail to put an individual on
notice as to what type of conduct is prohibited. 94 The vast majority of
vagueness challenges have alleged that certain words in the laws
prohibiting panhandling have more than one meaning or are
otherwise unclear. 95 Since the language of the law is ambiguous, so
the argument goes, a person is unable to determine whether his or her
contemplated conduct violates the law. A fundamental tenet of due
process is that an individual cannot be punished for something that
the law did not clearly indicate was punishable at the time the offense
was committed. 96 Thus, when the homeless are prosecuted under
ambiguous panhandling laws, they are being denied due process
because the law did not make clear that panhandling was punishable
conduct.
Courts, however, have not been receptive to challenges for
vagueness. In general, courts have usually dismissed such challenges
by holding that the meaning of the challenged term is apparent to an
individual of ordinary intelligence in the context of the statute; thus
the statute provides adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. 97 To
date, no vagueness challenge to anti-panhandling statutes has been
successful. Such a track record indicates that the argument would be
of limited utility in future attacks on anti-homeless legislation.
c. Equal Protection
A third type of challenge against laws prohibiting or restricting
panhandling has been brought under the Equal Protection Clause.
94. See Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wash. 1990) ("A statute is
unconstitutionally vague if persons of intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.") (quotation marks omitted).
95. See, e.g., State ex rel. Williams v. City Court of Tucson, 520 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Ariz. 1974)
(determining that the word "begging" in an ordinance does put a reasonable person on notice as
to exactly what conduct was forbidden).
96.
The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct
is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
97. See, e.g., Chad v. Fort Lauderdale, 66 F. Supp.2d 1242, 1245 (N.D. Fla. 1998) (rejecting
vagueness challenge and holding that the words "soliciting," "begging," and "panhandling" were
common terms known to everyone of ordinary intelligence).
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Equal protection challenges allege that laws regulating begging,
panhandling, or similar activities are invalid because they disparately
affect the homeless as a class. 98 These arguments have generally
failed, however, for a variety of reasons.
i. Brief Overview of Current Equal Protection Doctrine9 9
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
prohibits states from denying any citizen equal protection of the
law. 10 0 When the Supreme Court is confronted with a case in which a
party alleges unequal treatment by a state in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, it generally applies "rational basis" scrutiny, asking
whether the alleged disparity in treatment is reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest.1 0
When the alleged disparate treatment
involves a fundamental right 0 2 or a suspect class,1 0 3 however, the
Court applies the "most rigid scrutiny,"'10 4 requiring a state to
demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and to show that the
inequality created by the state action is the least restrictive method of
achieving that interest.
ii. Equal Protection Doctrine Applied to the Homeless
Various U.S. courts have been asked to apply the Supreme
Court's Equal Protection doctrine to cases involving the homeless. In
Johnson v. City of Dallas,0 5 for instance, a Texas court, applying
rational basis scrutiny, held that the city's various laws restricting the

98. See, e.g., Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1340 (Wash. 1990) (respondent arguing that
statute at issue disparately affects the homeless as a class).
99. The Supreme Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence is exceedingly complex and a
detailed analysis of the Court's treatment of Equal Protection cases is beyond the scope of this
Note. I offer this concededly oversimplified summary simply as background to aid the reader in
understanding how the Equal Protection Clause might be applicable to the homeless.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
101. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (finding no Equal
Protection violation because "the classification has relation to the purpose for which it is made").
102. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (involving a punishment of
mandatory sterilization for a convicted thief).
103. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (involving classifications based on
race).
104. Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
105. 860 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
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removal of solid waste, prohibiting solicitation by coercion, specifying
hours of closure for city-owned parks, and defining criminal trespass
were rationally related to legitimate state interests, despite
allegations that they were likely to be disproportionately applied to
the conduct of the homeless. 10 6 Additionally, in Chad v. City of Fort
Lauderdale,0 7 a Florida court found that the regulation at issue,
which prohibited panhandling on a public beach, applied evenhandedly to persons aspiring to solicit, beg, or panhandle along the
beach, regardless of their agenda, and therefore did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, in Seattle v. Webster,108 a
Washington court refused to recognize the homeless as a suspect
class, 109 thereby allowing courts to continue applying only rational
basis scrutiny to anti-homeless laws. 11 0
Though equal protection did not initially seem to be a
successful means of challenging anti-homeless laws, equal protection
challenges may have gained ground in the past fifteen years. In Blair
v. Shanahan,"' for example, a federal district court in California held
that the California statute at issue did violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The statute made it a crime for any person to accost another
person in a public place for the purpose of begging. 1 2 The court held
that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause by distinguishing
lawful from unlawful conduct based on the content of the
communication. 1 1 3 The court noted that discriminating in such a way
was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial state interest 1 4 since
begging is so rarely used as a means of intimidation or coercion. Thus,
the court found that a ban was not justified. 115
106. Id. at 358.
107. 66 F. Supp.2d 1242 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
108. Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333, 1340-41 (Wash. 1990).
109. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("there may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution").
110. For an argument for why the homeless should be considered a suspect class, see
Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect
Classification,88 IOWA L. REV. 501 (2003).

111. 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
112. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(c) (West 2006).

113. See Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1325 (noting that the statute prohibits all begging, while
permitting other "accosts" or solicitations).
114. Id. The Blair court inquired about a "substantial" state interest as a result of the
Supreme Court's earlier holding that "[wihen government regulation discriminates among
speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the
legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests." Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461 (1980).
115. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1325-26 ("Solicitations for alms are not generally and frequently
enough proxies for intimidating or coercive threats to justify this statute.").
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The future success of equal protection arguments as a means of
striking down anti-homeless laws is unclear, as the Supreme Court
has refused to hold that the impoverished are a suspect class. 116 Since
the impoverished are not a suspect class, the government need only
show a rational basis for treating the homeless differently from other
citizens in order to withstand an equal protection challenge. Given
117 it is
that nearly all state action withstands rational basis scrutiny,
unlikely that a court will strike down a law that disproportionately
affects the homeless on the ground that it is not reasonably related to
a legitimate state interest.
d. Potentialfor a New Argument
In addition to the arguments detailed above, there is an
argument to be made that anti-homeless laws are unconstitutional on
a more fundamental level, Though few cities or states would be
candid enough to admit it, the goals of many anti-homeless laws are
almost certainly motivated in part by a desire to reduce the visibility
of the homeless in heavily trafficked areas."18 By passing laws
targeting the homeless, lawmakers are likely hoping to urge hombless
individuals to relocate to less regulated, and less traveled, areas. 1 9
The relocation of such individuals benefits the local economy of the
vacated city by encouraging tourism and commerce from those visitors
and shoppers who would ordinarily avoid areas with homeless people.
Regardless of the true reasons for passing anti-homeless
legislation, cities offer a variety of more politically palatable reasons
116. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (refusing to
subject discrimination on the basis of wealth to strict scrutiny).
117. Only the most irrational or illegitimate state action will fail the rational basis test. See
16B C.J.S., ConstitutionalLaw § 1120 (2005):
[U]nder the rational relation test or reasonable basis test, a challenged classification
scheme may be invalidated only if it is arbitrary or bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose, or if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the state's objective, and if no set of facts can reasonably be
conceived to justify it.
118. Cf. Paul Nyhan, Shelter Finds Itself Homeless, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12,
2005, at B1 ("The fact is many people don't want to work or live next to the homeless.").
119, If it could be proven that cities are in fact trying to get the homeless to leave, there
would be a potential for arguments that cities are making it so difficult for an individual to be
homeless that they (1) are effectively being banished from the city or (2) are being "dumped" on
neighboring cities or states. Both are likely prohibited as a matter of public policy and may be
unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment or a denial of due process. See Rutherford v.
Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979) ("To permit one state to dump its convict
criminals into another is not in the interests of safety and welfare."); State v. Doughtie, 74
S.E.2d 922, 923 (N.C. 1953) (noting that the general rule throughout the nation is that a state
court may not impose a sentence of banishment); People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930)
("[Banishment] is not authorized by statute, and is impliedly prohibited by public policy.").
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in support of these laws, including preventing crime, protecting the
homeless from becoming crime victims, avoiding public health
hazards, preventing fraud, preserving public order, protecting
members of audiences and bystanders, avoiding annoyance and public
nuisance, protecting local merchants, and aiding traffic flow. 120 The
state statutes and municipal ordinances that purport to advance these
interests, however, may be so ineffective as a means of advancing
them that a court may not consider the laws rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.
Such statutes and ordinances
should be invalidated as unconstitutional deprivations of due process.

III. THE POTENTIAL FOR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES TO
ANTI-HOMELESS LAWS

Given the failures of previous challenges to anti-homeless laws,
advocates for the homeless are in need of a novel approach if they are
to be successful in striking down these laws. Substantive due process
challenges that attack the motivations for passing laws that target the
homeless may provide such a novel approach. As the result of several
Supreme Court decisions, courts are unlikely to be receptive to
substantive due process arguments based on the federal Constitution.
State courts, however, have displayed a tendency to interpret state
constitutions in such a way as to provide greater limitations on the
types of conduct that a state may criminalize under its police
powers. 12 1 As such, substantive due process arguments alleging that
city or state legislatures have overstepped the bounds of their police
powers in criminalizing certain conduct may be more likely to succeed
at the state level.
A. Why Substantive Due Process Challenges Under the Federal
ConstitutionAre Doomed to Fail
The ideal weapon with which to attack local "anti-homeless"
laws would be a Supreme Court ruling that such laws violate one or
more provisions of the federal Constitution. Such a ruling would be

120. See, e.g., Portland v. Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting
legislative finding that individuals who establish campsites as a temporary place to live "are
creating unsafe and unsanitary living situations which pose a threat to the peace, health and
safety of themselves and other citizens of the City").
121. See, e.g., Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Mass. 1965)
("What is permissible under the Federal Constitution ... is not necessarily permissible under
State law. The Constitution of a State may guard more jealously against the exercise of the
State's police power.").
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the "supreme Law of the Land" 122 and would require that inconsistent
laws and judicial decisions be overturned. 123 As a result, and as
evidenced by the challenges discussed above, advocates for the
homeless have focused on the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution as possible limitations on a
government's power to pass anti-homeless legislation. 124 Plaintiffs
have raised procedural due process arguments in alleging that antihomeless statutes are unconstitutionally vague because such statutes
fail to provide either sufficient notice as to what conduct is prohibited
or guidelines for police officers to follow in enforcing the law. 125 A
homeless plaintiff could also make a plausible substantive due process
argument by alleging that the liberty in question (i.e., the liberty to
sleep, sit, or lie down in public) is a fundamental right that the
government may not infringe upon without a compelling justification.
As discussed below, the Supreme Court has rejected such arguments
in the past, but it is not inconceivable that a future Court would find
them convincing.
1. Overview of Modern Substantive Due Process Doctrine
The doctrine of substantive due process was perhaps best
articulated in Mugler v. Kansas.126 In Mugler, Justice Harlan wrote
that while the states generally have broad police powers, there "are
limits ... beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go."1 27 He further
wrote that it is the duty of the judicial branch to ensure that states do
not abuse their police powers by wielding them too broadly: "If ...a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial
relation to those objects ...it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge,
128
and thereby give effect to the Constitution."'

122. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the laws made pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution "shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
123. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the principle of
judicial review and mandating that government action inconsistent with the Constitution be
invalidated).
124. See supra Part II.B.
125. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding a statute "void for
vagueness"); Chad v. Ft. Lauderdale, 66 F. Supp.2d 1242, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (describing a
court's two-part analysis of a vagueness challenge as "whether there has been sufficient notice,
and whether the legislature has established clear minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement").
126. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
127. Id. at 661.
128. Id.
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In the ensuing decades, the Court, adhering to the doctrine of
substantive due process announced in Mugler, struck down more than
129
one hundred state statutes as exceeding state legislative power.
Critics denounced the Court's holdings in these cases, claiming the
Court had substituted its own judgment for legislative judgment in
violation of the principle of separation of powers. Critics point to
Lochner v. New York as perhaps the most famous and egregious
instance of the Court substituting its own judgment for that of a state
legislature. 130
At issue in Lochner was a New York law that limited the
maximum number of hours bakers could work each week.1 3 1 Despite
evidence in the record that tended to show that bakeries were
unhealthy places to work 32 and precedent upholding state labor laws
that protected the health of employees, 33 the Supreme Court struck
134
the law down as an overbroad exercise of state legislative power.
The Court held that the statute at issue was not sufficiently related to
protecting the health of bakers and thus could not be regarded as a
health law.1 3 5 Rather, the Court held that the purpose of the law was
simply an impermissible interference with the freedom of an employer
13 6
to contract for labor with his employees.
After years of being lambasted by politicians and law
professors who believed that Lochner turned the Court into a
superlegislature that could essentially veto any laws that it
disapproved of, the Court grew more hesitant to second-guess the
wisdom and authority of state legislatures. It subsequently retreated
from its position in Mugler and amended its definition of substantive
due process to require only that a law "not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained."' 37 The Court
eventually began to defer to state legislatures in matters of state
police power, noting that the Supreme Court was not designed to "sit
as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide

129. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 3.3(a) (2d ed. 2003).
130. 1 98 U.S. 45 (1905).

131. See id. at 52.
132. See id. at 58 (noting a lower court judge's conclusion that the evidence tended to show
that working in a bakery led to respiratory disease).
133. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding a state law regulating the
number of hours an employee could work in an underground mine).
134. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64-65.

135. Id. at 64.
136. Id.

137. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
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whether the policy it expresses offends the public welfare." 138 While
139 it
the Court reiterated that state legislative power has its limits,
conceded that "the state legislatures have constitutional authority to
experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own
standard of the public welfare; they may within extremely broad
limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long as specific
constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts
140
with valid and controlling federal laws are avoided."
By expanding the substantive due process doctrine in Lochner
to allow for the substitution of judicial judgment for legislative
judgment, the Court created a controversy so great that it nearly led
the President of the United States to fundamentally alter the
Supreme Court's structure. 141 It took nearly thirty years for the Court
to untangle the mess created by its decision in Lochner and to accept
its role in the federal government as judge of the constitutionality, not
the wisdom, of state action. The Court today is exceedingly unlikely to
hold that a state exceeded its police powers in creating a particular
law. 142
2. Contemporary Substantive Due Process Challenges
If a law targeting the homeless were challenged in the
Supreme Court on substantive due process grounds today, the law
would almost certainly be upheld. Applying a standard of review
deferential to the state legislature,1 43 the Court would likely hold that
138. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. After the Supreme Court struck down numerous pieces of New Deal legislation,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed that Justices be added to the Court to change the
balance of opinion on the Court. See generally THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (3d
ed. 2002), availableat http://www.bartleby.com/59/12/rooseveltsco.html.
142. There are, however, two cases in which the Court might possibly find a state to have
exceeded its authority. The first is when the state has interfered with what the Court deems to
be a "fundamental" right. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain
'fundamental' rights are involved... regulation limiting these rights may only be justified by a
Icompelling state interest."'); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) ("This Court has
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation
omitted). The second is where a state regulates certain conduct for purely moral reasons. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) ("Moral disapproval ... is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.").
143. This deferential test, commonly known as the rational basis test, is a two-pronged test
that analyzes state action by asking first whether the state is attempting to achieve a legitimate
governmental interest and then whether the method chosen is rationally related to that interest.
See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("[The law need not be
in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is
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the state has a legitimate governmental interest in preventing the
commission of crime, reducing health hazards, or preserving public
order. Furthermore, nearly every imaginable method of regulating
the conduct of the homeless-including laws outlawing or regulating
vagrancy, sleeping in public, or begging-is related in some rational
way to one of these governmental interests, even if the method is ill144
conceived to the point of being asinine.
Consider a hypothetical law prohibiting sleeping in public. In
defense of such a law, a local government could assert an interest in
preventing crime. The prevention of crime is without question a
legitimate governmental interest, as evidenced by the innumerable
criminal laws of cities and states. Furthermore, the government can
probably demonstrate that the law is rationally related to the
prevention of crime merely by presenting legislative findings that at
least a handful of crimes in city or state history were committed by
people who had been sleeping in public. While a blanket prohibition
on all sleeping in public may not be the most effective way of dealing
with a particular crime or the most efficient use of law enforcement
resources, it is certainly rationally related to crime prevention if the
legislature has found that at least some people who sleep in public
commit crimes. Since the Supreme Court is now quite deferential to
the judgment of state lawmakers,' 45 it is unlikely the Court would
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment requires more than this type of
tenuous connection in order to uphold the prohibition on sleeping in
public if confronted with a substantive due process challenge.
B. Hope for the Homeless Under State Constitutions
Despite the almost certain failure of substantive due process
challenges under the federal Constitution, the potential exists for
successful due process challenges under state constitutional law.
State courts have showed a willingness to invoke state substantive
due process doctrines to strike down statutes that would likely have
been upheld under the federal Constitution. 1 46 Simply because the
an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative
measure was a rational way to correct it.").
144. The Court has expressed a tendency to uphold state laws even when they are an
inefficient means of dealing with a legitimate governmental concern. See id. ("[Tihe law need not
be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional."); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (calling the law at issue
"uncommonly silly," "unwise," and "asinine," but refusing to find it unconstitutional).
145. See supra §III(A)(I).
146. See Neil Colman McCabe, State Constitutions and Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP.
L. REV. 521, 526 (1998).

1438

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4:1413

U.S. Supreme Court would find a state criminal statute consistent
with the federal Constitution, it does not follow that the state's
highest court will reach a similar conclusion vis-i-vis the state
constitution.
Additionally, one of the primary criticisms of Lochner is
inapplicable when applied to instances of state courts overruling state
legislatures. Lochner was criticized most harshly for permitting as
few as five Justices to establish policy for the entire nation by
substituting their own judgment for that of state legislatures. The
biggest problem with a scenario in which five Supreme Court Justices
overrule a state legislature is that the Justices are unlikely to be
experts on conditions unique to each individual state which call for
unique, individualized remedies. Such may not be the case when state
judges review the actions of state legislative bodies. Since state judges
preside over much smaller jurisdictions than Supreme Court Justices,
they are more likely to be in touch with problems and conditions that
are unique to their states. As such, they are in a far better position to
judge the wisdom and desirability of state legislative action. The
arguments against Lochner thus do not apply as forcefully when state
judges overrule state legislatures.
It is difficult to generalize about state courts with respect to
substantive due process issues, as constitutional provisions and
interpretations of those provisions vary among jurisdictions. Some
state courts have followed the example of the U.S. Supreme Court and
are reluctant to hold that a state has abused its police powers in
violation of the state's doctrine of substantive due process; other
courts, however, have interpreted their constitutions more liberally
and have been willing to hold that legislatures exercised more power
than authorized by the state constitution. 147
State courts may find a number of factors relevant in analyzing
a criminal law under their varying doctrines of substantive due
process. Such factors include whether the law addresses a specific
problem, whether that problem requires a criminal penalty, whether
the criminal penalty is an effective solution to the problem, whether
the criminal law is likely to disproportionately benefit a particular
group, whether the law prohibits a legitimate business, and whether
the law is likely to make harmless conduct criminal. Each of these
factors is discussed in detail below.

147. See, e.g., Monrad G. Paulsen, The Persistenceof Substantive Due Process in the States,
34 MINN. L. REV. 91, 98-99 (1950).
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1. Advancing "Public Welfare"
In some jurisdictions, courts take a more limited view of the
purposes for which the state's police power may be exercised. In these
jurisdictions, courts allow the state to use its police power to address
specific threats to public morals, health, and safety, but are less likely
to permit the police power to be used for the generic purpose of
advancing the public welfare. 148 In jurisdictions that take such a
limited view of police powers, courts may invalidate laws that purport
to improve the public in a general way, such as improving a
community's aesthetics, 149 but which are not directed to a specific
problem. The trend, however, appears to be moving away from such a
limited view of a state's police powers, 150 thus state courts are
increasingly likely to permit legislatures to exercise the state's police
powers to address a fairly broad or generic problem without finding a
due process violation.
2. The Problem does not Require a Criminal Penalty
Since state courts are perceived to be more in touch with local
conditions, they are often more skeptical of legislative conclusions that
a problem exists which requires a criminal penalty. 151 While the U.S.
Supreme Court generally is willing to assume the existence of the
152
facts that prompted a state legislature to pass a given criminal law,
state courts are far more willing to analyze the alleged need for
criminal legislation 153 and will invalidate laws if they determine that
the evil perceived by the legislature does not in fact exist. 15 4 In Coffee
Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health,15 5 for example, a
Massachusetts court invalidated a statute making it an offense to sell
Coffee-Rich, a particular brand of imitation cream.
The state
defended the statute on the ground that the state was concerned that
consumers would confuse Coffee-Rich with real cream.15 6 The court
148. Id.

149. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74 (N.C. 1959) (invalidating a statute that made it
a crime to own a junkyard within 150 feet of a highway, unless concealed from view), overruled
by State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982).
150. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, § 3.3(b); see also Montgomery v. Norman, 816 So. 2d 72, 79
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 865 S.W.2d 332, 338 (Ky. 1993).
151. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, § 3.3(b)(2).

152. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949).
153. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, § 3.3(b)(2).
154. Id.

155. 204 N.E.2d 281 (Mass. 1965).
156. See id. at 287 (noting that the law at issue was "designed to avoid confusion of other
products with defined and familiar foods") (citation omitted).
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concluded that the average consumer of that state would not be
confused, noting first, that Coffee-Rich, unlike real cream, was sold in
the frozen foods sections of supermarkets and second, that
"[c]onspicuous lettering on the container of [Coffee-Rich] announces to
all who can read that Coffee-Rich is a 'vegetable product' which
'contains no milk or milk fat."' 157 In invalidating the law, the court
determined that the potential for confusion of consumers was so
minimal that the criminal penalty was unwarranted. State courts
may thus strike down criminal penalties where they find that no
criminal penalty is justified.
3. Ineffective Legislative Response to the Problem
A third factor that courts may consider in evaluating
challenges to criminal laws, such as those that punish the homeless,
based on state substantive due process doctrines is whether a criminal
penalty is an effective response to a problem confronting the state.
State courts are more likely than federal courts to decide for
themselves whether criminalization is an effective means of dealing
with a particular problem. 158 Smaller geographic areas and electoral
accountability generally allow state courts to be more familiar with
1 60
unique local conditions than are federal courts. 159 State v. Park
provides a salient example of a state court's willingness to scrutinize
legislative conclusions about the need for a criminal law. Park
involved a Nevada law making it illegal to possess cattle hide from
which the ears had been removed or the brand obliterated.1 61 The
court conceded that cattle theft was a significant problem in the state,
but it nevertheless invalidated the statute, finding that it was broad
enough to cover the innocent activity of manufacturing leather goods,
162
while unlikely to result in the conviction of people who stole cattle.
The court reasoned that a cattle thief could get around the statute by
simply disposing of the hide, which was far less valuable than the
cattle carcass, 163 and thus struck down the law. 164 In contrast to the

157. Id.
158. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, § 3.3(b)(3).
159. Cf. id. § 3.3(b)(2).
160. 178 P. 389 (Nev. 1919).
161. Id. at 390.
162. See id. at 392 ("[T]he statute entirely prohibits the use of hides in this state. To prevent
a few from illegal practices the many are deprived of the use of property.").
163. See id. ("Cattle are stolen for the value of the carcass, and not for the hides....
Consequently the more effectively the latter are destroyed the less is the risk of detection.").
164. Id. at 393.
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state court in Park, the Supreme Court has refused to examine "the
165
adequacy or practicability of the law" being challenged.
State courts are also more willing than are federal courts to
consider alternative, less restrictive methods of resolving state
problems when judging the validity of state laws. 166 While the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that it will refuse to
inquire into the wisdom of a state's choice of remedies, 167 state courts
State courts
are generally free to make such an inquiry. 68
occasionally invalidate laws when they decide that the legislature
could have found an equally effective but less severe method of serving
the public interest. 69 For instance, an Arizona court held that a
statute criminalizing the sale of certain food products, such as
imitation ice cream, failed to meet Arizona's due process requirements
because the objective of the law could have been achieved just as well
by requiring clear product labeling. 70 Similarly, a court in Nevada
invalidated a law regulating the size of signs that may be used to
advertise the price of gasoline at service stations because the law's
purpose in preventing misleading advertising could have been
accomplished at least as well by regulating the content rather than
the size of such signs.' 71 These cases are illustrative of the tendency of
state courts to determine that non-criminal solutions were likely to be
more effective in resolving a particular problem than were the
criminal penalties chosen by their legislatures.
4. Disproportionate Benefit to a Particular Group or Class
Since state courts are generally thought to be familiar with
local conditions, they are more likely than federal courts to invalidate
laws if they find that the laws are intended to benefit a particular
group more than the population in general. 172 The Supreme Court has
refused to speculate about the motives of state legislatures, provided
there is some legitimate purpose upon which a statute could be
based. 173 Some state courts, by contrast, have taken the position that
165. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
166. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, § 3.3(b)(4).

167. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
168. 1 LAFAVE, supra,note 129, § 3.3(b)(4).

169. Id.
170. See State v. A.J. Bayless Mkts., Inc., 342 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Ariz. 1959).
171. See State v. Redman Petroleum Corp., 360 P.2d 842, 846 (Nev. 1961).
172. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, § 3.3(b)(5).
173. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (refusing to speculate that the
legislature's true motive in passing a statute barring females from becoming bartenders was "an
unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to monopolize the calling").
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"if the dominant purpose of the legislation be to serve private interests
under the cloak of the general public good, the resulting legislation is
a perversion and abuse of power and therefore unlawful. ... ,174 This
is not to say, however, that merely showing that a special interest
group proposed or drafted legislation is enough to render it
unconstitutional. 175 Even absent evidence of a legislature's motives,
state courts have struck down criminal laws that were apparently
intended to aid some special interest group rather than to advance the
interests of the general public. 176 Scholars agree that this type of
judicial review is appropriate given the prominent role of lobbyists
177
and wealthy campaign contributors in the state legislative process.
5. Prohibition of a Legitimate Business
Some state courts have held that a state's police power may not
be used to prohibit a "legitimate" business. While the Supreme Court
abandoned such a position in Ferguson v. Skrupa,178 several states
continue to follow the rule the Supreme Court established in Adams v.
Tanner. 79 The Adams rule states that due process forbids a state
from prohibiting an industry that is useful to some and neither
immoral nor dangerous to public well-being. 8 0 A Pennsylvania court,
for instance, held that criminalizing the business of debt adjusting
was unconstitutional, finding that the mere possibility of fraud by
those engaged in the profession did not justify an outright prohibition
8
of the industry.' '

174. Gundaker Cent. Motors v. Gassert, 127 A.2d 566, 573 (N.J. 1956).
175. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, §3.3(b)(5).

176. See id. § 3.3(b)(5) n.49.
177.
In some states the judiciary is reluctant to sit idly by while minority groups capture
the machinery of the state in order to secure a monopoly position. Given the short
legislative session in many states and the concentrated attention which pressure
groups may devote to that session, one may well sympathize with that point of view.
Paulsen, supra note 147, at 117; see John A. C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and
Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw U. L. REV. 226, 249 (1958) ("Judicial invalidation of such
legislation may be technically anti-democratic, but it can hardly be called frustration of the
popular will in any meaningful sense.").
178. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 129, § 3.3(b)(6) n.52.
179. 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
180. Id. at 594 (holding that the possibility for abuses to arise in connection with a profession
is not a reason for absolutely prohibiting that profession to those who wish to engage in the
profession in an upright way).
181. Commonwealth v. Stone, 155 A.2d 453, 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).
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6. Criminalization of harmless conduct
Another argument against criminal statutes that has found
some success in state courts is the contention that the criminal statute
is overbroad because it proscribes more conduct than is actually or
potentially harmful to the public. Advocates have argued that some
criminal statutes are overbroad and an unlawful exercise of state
police powers, claiming that it is inappropriate for a state to proscribe
certain conduct where not all who engage in the proscribed conduct
are likely to cause harm.18 2 Examples of statutes intended to remedy
legitimate harms, but which also prohibit certain innocent conduct
include juvenile curfews or age limits for certain activities (in response
to juvenile crime);18 3 bans on the possession of devices associated with
substance abuse, such as needles and syringes, without a doctor's
permission (in response to illegal drug trafficking);' 8 4 and selling
magazines without covers (in response to the fraudulent act of
returning magazine covers for credit and then selling the coverless
18 5
magazine for profit).
In evaluating these types of statutes, state courts often ask
whether it is reasonable to presume the existence of one fact based on
the proof of another. 8 6 For instance, the statute prohibiting the
possession of needles and syringes was invalidated because the court
found that it essentially created "a conclusive presumption that the
possession is for an illegal purpose-an unrebuttable presumption
which factually runs counter to human experience."'1 7 The court held
it unreasonable to presume that the possession of needles and
syringes was related to harmful activity, since there are non-harmful
reasons for possessing such items, l8 8 such as in the case of a diabetic
who needs to give herself an insulin injection. Similarly, other courts
have invalidated laws based on the conclusion that a relatively high
percentage of individuals who might engage in the prohibited conduct
18 9
would be unlikely to have any "evil" purpose in doing so.

182. Id.

183. See Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957);
People v. Munoz, 172 N.E.2d 535, 536-37 (N.Y. 1961).
184. See State v. Birdsell, 104 So. 2d 148, 152 (La. 1958).
185. See People v. Bunis, 172 N.E.2d 273, 273 (N.Y. 1961).
186. Id.
187. Birdsell, 104 So. 2d at 153.
188. See id. at 153-54 ("[T]he article in question, as is well recognized, is widely used for
numerous beneficial and helpful purposes.").
189. See, e.g., Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 306 P.2d 601, 605 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957) (noting that the juvenile curfew at issue made "unlawful many... activities by minors
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IV. THE CASE AGAINST ANTI-HOMELESS LAWS IN STATE COURTS
Based on the language and interpretations of state
constitutions, the laws of a number of American cities and states may
be susceptible to substantive due process challenges based on state
constitutions using one or more of the grounds discussed above.

A. Laws Allegedly Advancing the Public Welfare That do not Address
a Specific Health, Safety, or Moral Issue
Laws prohibiting sleeping in public continue to exist in a
number of American cities. 190 One can argue that such laws exist
purely for the protection of a city's aesthetics and for the convenience
of its merchants, shoppers, and tourists and do little, or nothing, to
further the health, safety, or morality of the general public. Like a
law prohibiting an unconcealed junkyard near a public highway, 191 a
law prohibiting sleeping in public is arguably intended exclusively to
protect a city's aesthetic image. Underlying such a law is likely a
desire to prevent residents from being discouraged from using public
parks and sidewalks by the "unsightly" homeless individuals who
sleep there.
A ban on sleeping in public cannot be reasonably defended on
the grounds that it protects the general public from a potential harm.
The only harms such a ban seeks to prevent are the loss of enjoyment
of public facilities by those who choose not to be around the homeless
and the economic loss suffered by merchants whose patrons choose not
to shop at stores located in areas where they will encounter the
homeless. 192 If these are harms at all, they are harms caused by
individuals choosing not to associate with a certain class of people (i.e.,
the homeless), not by any danger to public health, safety, or morality.

which would otherwise be entirely lawful" including attending night classes, studying at the
library, and attending games, dances, or other school functions).
190. See, e.g.,

ATLANTIC

CITY, N.J., CODE § 204-24

(2006); LOUISVILLE,

KY., CODE §

132.03(A)(18) (2006).
191. See State v. Brown, 108 S.E.2d 74, 75 (N.C. 1959), overruled by State v. Jones, 290
S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1982).
192. Economic harm might result from a decrease in a city's tourism and commerce caused
by the perception that a particular city is a place where homeless people are sleeping everywhere
around the city. Tourists and shoppers, not wanting to make themselves uncomfortable by being
forced to acknowledge the homeless, would avoid these areas, thereby decreasing the revenues of
businesses in the areas where the homeless gather to sleep. Such a justification might be
attacked on the ground that it disproportionately benefits special interest over the public at
large. See infra Part IV.D.
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B. A Problem Does Not Exist that Calls for a CriminalRemedy
Anti-homeless laws are also vulnerable to the argument that
they address problems that are either non-existent or greatly
exaggerated. For instance, in passing a law that prohibited camping
anywhere on public property in the city, 193 the Portland, Oregon, City
Council alleged that homeless persons who established campsites on
public property were "creating unsafe and unsanitary living situations
which pose a threat to the peace, health and safety of themselves and
other citizens of the City."'194 If a court had examined the council's
assertion with the healthy skepticism exhibited by the court in CoffeeRich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health,195 it likely would have
found that the alleged threat to peace, health, and safety was far less
dire than the council made it out to be. While public camping may
have occasionally created unsafe and unsanitary living conditions, the
individuals creating them were likely few in number and the
conditions almost certainly did not pose such a serious threat to
themselves or other Portland citizens as to necessitate an
unconditional citywide ban on public camping.
Rather than trying to remedy a legitimate threat to the peace,
health, and safety of the public, the Portland City Council arguably
passed the anti-camping ordinance out of a desire to move the city's
homeless "residents" out of sight and to encourage them to leave
Portland. The lack of a legitimate problem to be remedied may have
been an unstated rationale when an Oregon court held the Portland
196
anti-camping ordinance unconstitutional several years later.
Prohibitions on sleeping in public are not the only types of laws
subject to the argument that no problem exists that requires a
criminal remedy. Cities that have implemented outright bans on
begging or panhandling in public places, 197 rather than reasonable
regulations of such activities, 9 8 are also vulnerable to the argument
193. See PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 14.08.250 (2000). The Portland law was later declared
unconstitutional. Oregon v. Wicks, Case Nos. Z711742 & Z711743 (Or. Cir. Ct. 2000).
194. See City of Portland v. Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting
PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 14.08.250).
195. 204 N.E.2d 281 (Mass. 1965) (invalidating a statute making it unlawful to sell imitation
cream on the grounds that a reasonable citizen can tell the difference between real and imitation
cream).
196. See Wicks, Case Nos. Z711742 & Z711743 (Or. Cir. Ct. 2000) (finding the ordinance
unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of equal protection and a violation
of the right to travel).
197. See, e.g., CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 21-111 (2006); DETROIT, MICH., CODE § 38-1-1
(2006).
198. Regulating the time during which begging may take place and the locations where an
individual may beg are usually reasonable restrictions on such conduct, provided they still allow
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that they are addressing a "phantom" problem in order to further an
economically motivated or self-serving agenda.
C. The Means Chosen to Deal with a Legitimate Problem are
Ineffective
Anti-homeless laws are also susceptible to the argument that a
non-criminal remedy would address the problems created by
homelessness more effectively than a criminal solution. Criminalizing
conduct such as begging and sleeping in public raises the obvious
moral dilemma of whether it is appropriate to punish an individual for
carrying out a life-sustaining and harmless activity in public when
there are no other realistic alternatives. 199 Rather than adding insult
to injury by arresting the homeless for essentially having nowhere else
to go, it seems that the proper reaction of a caring and responsible
society would be to offer some sort of assistance in finding food and
shelter.
Perhaps more importantly, however, anti-homeless laws are
counterproductive if their goal is to reduce the problem of
homelessness. Studies have shown that it costs more to incarcerate
individuals than to provide them with housing, food, and
counseling. 20 0
Furthermore, when police arrest or cite homeless
individuals, the resulting police records make it even more difficult for
those seeking jobs to secure gainful employment. 20 1 Finally, when
police force the homeless to leave certain parts of a city, they almost
always move them further from the social service centers-usually
located in downtown areas-that offer medical care, job training, and
other aid that is necessary to overcome the usually temporary
condition of homelessness. 20 2 By criminalizing conduct that the
homeless can realistically only engage in publicly, cities are
compounding rather than ameliorating the problem of homelessness.
the individual access to those from whom he is reasonably likely to receive a donation. A
regulation limiting begging to daylight hours, for example, furthers a legitimate interest in
creating a feeling of public safety. Similarly, restricting begging activities to certain parts of
sidewalks advances the legitimate interest in preserving the free flow of automobile and
pedestrian traffic.
199. The majority of cities in America have far fewer spaces in shelters available than are
needed to adequately care for the number of homeless residents residing in these cities. See
generally UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 35, at 37-41. Thus, most

homeless individuals are not choosing to sleep in public instead of in a shelter; rather, there is no
room for them to sleep in shelters and they have no viable alternative than to sleep in a public
place.
200. COMBATING THE CRIMINALIZATION, supra note 39, at 4.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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The problem is thus one that is poorly addressed by a criminal
2 03
solution.
D. A Criminal Statute DisproportionatelyBenefits Special Interest
Groups
Anti-homeless statutes also could be invalidated on the ground
that they benefit special interest groups far more than the general
public. The individuals most adversely affected by the presence of the
homeless in the city are typically not victims of crimes perpetrated by
the homeless, but rather, business owners who lose customers due to
the presence of the homeless near their stores. Statutes intended to
keep the homeless from begging and sleeping in public, therefore, are
rarely implemented in an effort to protect the public health or safety.
Far more often, anti-homeless statutes are passed to benefit the small
group of wealthy business owners who are able to effectively lobby the
city council to serve their business interests. In these cases, it would
seem as though the statutes are designed to "serve private interests
under the cloak of the general public good,"' 20 4 rather than to remedy a
legitimate public problem.
E. States are Outlawing a "Business"that is Neither Immoral Nor
Dangerousto the Public
Several American cities have passed laws completely
prohibiting begging or panhandling, with no exceptions. 20 5 These laws
are vulnerable to the argument that due process restricts a state from
absolutely prohibiting any business that is not "useful" or "inherently
immoral or dangerous to the public welfare." 20 6 Since some view
begging as a useful business, a city that outlaws begging may be
depriving individuals who wish to engage in the business of begging of
due process under the doctrines of some states. While it is certainly
debatable whether begging is a useful business, at least one court
noted that:
203. This has been noted by courts that have been persuaded by the argument that antihomeless laws burden the right of homeless individuals to travel. See Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F.
Supp. 1551, 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("Because the City's interests in maintaining public areas and
in promoting tourism and business can be achieved without arresting homeless individuals,
these interests cannot justify the burden that the arrests place on the right to travel.").
204. Gundaker Cent. Motors v. Gassert, 127 A.2d 566, 573 (N.J. 1956).
205. See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 54-411 (2006); CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 21-111

(2006).
206. See Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 593 (1917). Adams was strongly criticized in a later
case. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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A request for alms clearly conveys information regarding the speaker's plight. Begging
gives the speaker an opportunity to spread his views and ideas on, among other things,
the way our society treats its poor and disenfranchised. And in some cases, a beggar's
request can change the way the listener sees his or her relationship with and obligations
207
to the poor.

A cogent argument can thus be made that enlightening passers-by
should be considered a useful activity.
Begging is not inherently dangerous to the public. Citizens are
placed in no danger when an individual simply and politely asks for a
donation as they pass. 20 8 And while undoubtedly some homeless
individuals use donations for purposes of questionable morality, 20 9 the
potential or even likelihood that some members of a profession will
engage in harmful or immoral conduct does not justify an absolute
prohibition of that profession in states that still adhere to the Adams
rule. 210 Outright bans on panhandling in Adams states are therefore
ripe for attack.
F. States Are CriminalizingConduct That Can Be Engaged in
Innocently
A strong case can be made that cities have overstepped the
boundaries of their police powers and violated due process where they
have unconditionally prohibited begging or sleeping in public. It is
possible to engage in both activities without causing any of the harms
that such prohibitions purport to prevent. Depending on the wording
of the law, a citywide ban on begging may be broad enough to
encompass the innocent acts of the Salvation Army ringing a bell and
soliciting donations outside department stores around the holidays or

207. Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1322-23 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated, 919 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see also Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First
Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 908 (1991) (noting that begging does
more than propose a commercial transaction, appealing to the listener's sense of compassion and
social justice).
208. So-called "aggressive panhandling" is appropriately regulated as a threat to the public
welfare. Many cities have laws that outlaw begging activities such as following a pedestrian once
he has passed, intentionally blocking vehicular or pedestrian traffic while soliciting donations in
order to solicit donations and using profane or abusive language in requesting donations. See,
e.g., ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., CODE § 12-2-28 (2006). This type of conduct is easily addressed by a
narrowly tailored law, however, and does not justify a blanket ban on begging of all kinds.
209. It is safe to assume that some homeless individuals spend donations on drugs and
alcohol, since one-third of all homeless are estimated to have substance abuse problems. See
supra note 30.
210. See Commonwealth v. Stone, 155 A.2d 453, 455 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959) ("The mere
possibility, however, that one engaged in a lawful business may also engage in unlawful
practices is no justification for prohibiting the business, if it be a legitimate one in the first
instance.").
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Girl Scouts selling cookies. 211 Few would argue that these activities
should be prohibited, and most would agree that these activities in
fact benefit society by providing for the needy and raising funds for
youth activities.
Similarly, an absolute prohibition on sleeping in public would
prevent the businessman from taking a nap in a public park on his
lunch break or a sunbather from falling asleep at the beach on a
sunny weekend afternoon-both perfectly legitimate and harmless
ways of spending one's leisure time. Even assuming that safety,
health, or morality issues were implicated by homeless individuals
who beg or sleep in public places, these types of outright bans are
arguably an abuse of the state's police power, since they are so broad
as to encompass activities that are innocent and even beneficial to
society.
As demonstrated above, substantive due process arguments
that have been accepted by state courts in the past can be applied to
anti-homeless laws that penalize conduct largely unique to the
homeless, although the merits of such arguments may be questionable
in some cases. A court might be receptive to an otherwise weak
substantive due process argument, however, if an advocate could
present the court with a demonstrably effective alternative solution to
the problems underlying a criminal law targeting the homeless.
Fortunately, such alternative solutions do exist.
V. NON-CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVES

Invalidating anti-homeless laws as violations of state
substantive due process doctrines is merely the first step in curtailing
the proliferation of the homeless population in the United States. If
existing laws were struck down, local governments would need to
replace them with programs that assist the homeless in finding
permanent homes, medical treatment, and employment opportunities,
while helping other residents feel more comfortable being in areas
where the homeless congregate. Several U.S. cities are demonstrating
the feasibility of non-criminal solutions to the problems associated
with homelessness. The viability of non-criminal methods of dealing

211. Such a broad ban is not unrealistic. Consider the law at issue in Perry v. Los Angeles
Police Department, which stated that "[n]o person shall hawk, peddle or vend any goods, wares or
merchandise, or beg or solicit alms or donations upon" any sidewalk, boardwalk or public way in
an area near Venice Beach. Perry v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 121 F.3d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir.
1997) (emphasis added). Apparently concerned that the breadth of the ban would prohibit certain
beneficial activities, the city created two exceptions to it: (1) the sale of magazines and
newspapers; and (2) the solicitation of donations or sale of goods by non-profit organizations. Id.
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with the homeless is likely to make state courts more willing to strike
down anti-homeless laws and recommend that lawmakers adopt
similar non-criminal measures.
A. Washington, D.C.
In response to a lack of affordable housing in the metro area,
Washington, D.C. created a program called the "D.C. Downtown Day
Center. '212 The drop-in center serves approximately 260 people each
day during the times other shelters for the homeless are closed. 213 The
facility offers indoor seating, laundry facilities, showers, and a
morning meal. 2 14 The most notable aspect of the Washington, D.C.
program is its source of funding. The program was developed and is
215
funded by the D.C. Downtown Business Improvement District.
Businesses located within the District pay a tax of 1 cent for each
square foot of property they own. 216 The funds raised by the tax are
used to fund the Center and are enough to employ a full-time
2 17
director.
The Center has had success in placing "employment-ready"
individuals in jobs and has also made strides in aiding mentally ill
persons who have migrated to the D.C. area from out-of-state. 218 The
Center also attempts to contact the families of individuals who wish to
return home. 2 19 If an arrangement can be made with a family to
provide housing, the Center has agreements with Amtrak and
220
Greyhound to provide free transportation home.
B. Philadelphia,Pennsylvania
In an effort to control a homeless population estimated at 6,500
per day, with between 150 and 800 of those individuals living on the

212. NATIONAL
LAW
CENTER
ON
HOMELESSNESS
AND
POVERTY,
CONSTRUCTIVE
ALTERNATIVES TO CRIMINALIZATION: MODELS TO REPLICATE AND USEFUL TIPS TO CONSIDER

(2002), available at http://www.nlchp.org/FACivilRights/CR-conalt booklet.pdf.
213. NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, A DREAM DENIED: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES, available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/

crimreport/summary.html.
214. Id.
215. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.

219. Id.
220. Id.
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streets, 221 police officers in the city of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania used
to employ a law that prohibited obstructing public highways to force
homeless people off the city's streets. 222 The city eventually proposed
the "Sidewalk Behavior Bill" ("the Bill"), which regulated or prohibited
sitting or sleeping on public sidewalks and created zones from which
the homeless were prohibited around banks, ATMs, restaurants, and
other premises. 223 After learning about the proposed legislation,
homeless advocacy groups organized the Open Door Coalition, a
network set on preventing the passage of the Bill. 224 When the
Coalition first attempted to negotiate with the city for a suitable
225
alternative to the Bill, the city was reluctant, citing a lack of funds.
The Coalition subsequently took political action, staging sit-ins at city
hall, testifying at city council meetings, and lobbying key constituent
groups. 226 At the same time, members of the Coalition worked to
produce a document entitled Our Way Home: A Blueprint to End
Homelessness.227 The document was the result of interviews with
homeless and formerly homeless people, social service providers, case
workers, city officials, and academics. 228 With the publication of Our
Way Home, the Coalition attempted to offer the City Council practical,
concrete alternatives that would help get people off the streets and
into programs that provide services, without policing or criminalizing
229
them.
Although the Bill eventually became law, 230 it was amended to
include non-criminal penalties and stronger provisions for police to
work with outreach teams instead of simply arresting homeless
people. 23 1 The Coalition's actions also resulted in the city allocating
232
roughly $6 million toward social services for the homeless.
Advocates for the homeless worked closely with city leaders to develop
long-term strategies for addressing homelessness, including an

221. Gwen Shaffer, Gimme Shelter, PHILA. CITYPAPER, June 4-11, 1998, available at
http://citypaper.net/articles/060498hr.homeless.shtml.
222. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.

227. William O'Brien, Organize! Philadelphia Campaign Reshapes Homelessness Debate,
SHELTERFORCE

ONLINE,

(July/Aug. 1999), http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/106/organize.html

(last visited May 31, 2006).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.

231. O'Brien, supra note 227.
232. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.
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outreach hotline, additional shelter beds, and a written protocol for all
interactions between police officers and homeless individuals. 233 The
Coalition also created a task force, consisting of advocacy groups,
neighborhood associations, businesses, and city leaders, which was
designed to monitor the implementation and enforcement of the new
law.

23 4

As a result of the partnership between advocates for the
homeless and city leaders, very few individuals have been cited for
violations of the law. 235 Following the passage of the law, a Sidewalk
Ordinance Task Force was created, which included many city business
236
representatives, social service providers, and government officials.
The goal of the task force was to monitor ongoing implementation of
the new law. 237 Surveys conducted by advocacy groups indicated that
there was a significant reduction in the number of homeless on
Philadelphia's streets in the first two years after the Bill was passed.
City leaders attributed the result to the additional financial resources
that facilitated the availability of housing options for those living in
238
public spaces.
C. Fort Lauderdale,Florida
In the past, Fort Lauderdale police officers regularly used any
means possible to remove the homeless from public beaches and
downtown areas. 239 As a result of the Pottingercase, 240 however, and
the subsequent $1.5 million settlement in favor of the homeless, it
became clear to Fort Lauderdale officials that they were exposing
themselves to a similar lawsuit, so they began to seek other ways of
241
addressing homelessness.
Advocates for the homeless offered to educate police officers
about the causes of homelessness and the need for alternatives other
than enforcement action as a response to homelessness. 24 2
Additionally, after a survey of the community showed homelessness to
be a primary issue of concern, the city established a Homelessness

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See O'Brien, supranote 227.
Id.

238. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.

239. Id.
240. Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
241. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.

242. Id.
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Assistance Center ("Center"). 24 3 The Center offers 200 beds, and
provides the homeless with a health screening, a need assessment,
case management, and life management skills. 244 Following the
success of the first center, two additional centers were created. 245 In
addition, Fort Lauderdale police officers developed a written protocol
for encounters with the homeless, which explicitly states,
"[h]omelessness is not a crime. '' 246 The protocol encourages officers to
engage in casual, non-enforcement contact with homeless individuals
and to provide them with information about the various social services
available to them in the city and county. 247 The Fort Lauderdale
Center estimates that approximately 50 percent of their clients come
from police referrals. 248
In November 1999, one year after the
program began, police estimated that they had approached
approximately 1,000 homeless individuals and persuaded about 680 to
249
seek help from family or social service agencies.
With the success of Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Fort
Lauderdale, and other cities in finding viable alternatives to
criminalizing homelessness, state courts are likely to be receptive to
arguments that there are alternative methods of addressing
homelessness that treat the root of the problem, rather than merely
its symptoms.
Partnerships between homeless advocates and
community leaders (as in Washington, D.C.), increased financial
resources for social programs that serve the homeless (as in
Philadelphia), and written protocols encouraging police to warn, not
punish, the homeless and to disseminate information about services
available (as in Fort Lauderdale) have all proven successful in
combating the problems created by homelessness and are far more
productive solutions to homelessness than criminalization.
VI. CONCLUSION
Homelessness in the United States is a problem desperately in
need of a solution, and the problem is not likely to resolve itself
without some sort of government intervention. While cities certainly

243. Id.
244. BOB PUSINS, THE FORT LAUDERDALE MODEL: POLICE RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS,

availableat http://www.flpd.org/homeless5.html.
245. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.
246. PUSINS, supra note 244.
247. NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, supra note 212.

248. Lisa J. Huriash, Power of Positive Policing, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Nov. 12,
2000, availableat http://ci.ftlaud.fl.us/policehomeless6.html.
249. Id.
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have an interest in maintaining a clean, aesthetically pleasing, and
enjoyable environment, the homeless have due process interests that
must be weighed in any solution that a city may develop to remedy its
problems with homelessness.
The criminalization of homelessness inadequately balances a
city's desire to create a hospitable environment for its tourists and
citizens against the interests of the homeless in obtaining food,
shelter, employment assistance, counseling for addiction or mental
illness, and other social services. Citing or arresting individuals for
engaging in innocent and life-sustaining activities solely because the
city council has decided they are an eyesore is an inefficient means of
dealing with homelessness. The homeless are almost certainly unable
to afford any fines they may be assessed, which likely results in a
warrant being issued for their arrest once the fine becomes
delinquent. Arresting the homeless only takes them further from the
social services they need to overcome what is normally a temporary
situation.
Rather than turn to the criminal law for a solution, American
cities should follow the examples of a few innovative cities that are
developing constructive long-term solutions to homelessness.
Washington, D.C.'s "D.C. Downtown Day Center" is a model of how
business owners and city leaders can work together to help the
homeless, rather than exacerbating their problems with criminal
penalties. Philadelphia's Open Door Coalition provides a wonderful
model of how activists can work with city governments to ensure that
the homeless are represented, and how vast sums of money are not
always required to provide an effective solution to the problem. Fort
Lauderdale exemplifies the way a city should react to correct a
problem when citizens identified homelessness as a priority in need of
a solution. Other cities like Madison, Wisconsin, and Sacramento,
California, have chosen to create outreach programs to deal with
250
homelessness rather than resort to criminalization.
Homeless rights advocates have been creative in their
increasingly numerous challenges to laws aimed at the homeless.
While they have had a number of successes in their challenges to such
laws, these successes are still greatly outnumbered by their failures.
Advocates should continue to urge cities to deal with the problem of
homelessness in a more humane and forthright way by filing lawsuits
where local governments are passing criminal laws directed at the
250. See NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, SOLUTIONS THROUGH
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES: PRACTICAL MODELS TO HELP END HOMELESSNESS 3-4 (2004), available

at
http://www.nlchp.org/contentpubs/Solutions%20through%20alternative%20rem.%203-2404.pdf (describing the programs in Madison and Sacramento).
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homeless. The substantive due process challenges suggested in this
Note represent potential arguments for future litigants to use in state
courts to overturn those anti-homeless laws currently in existence in
favor of more progressive policies toward the homeless. The merits of
these arguments are debatable and the likelihood of success of each
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. State courts have shown
251
sympathy for the plight of the homeless in a number of cases,
however, and advocates for the homeless should use whatever
arguments they can find in hopes of reducing the criminalization of
homelessness.
In developing methods to deal with the homelessness problem
in the future, cities should increasingly look to those cities that have
developed constructive alternatives to criminalization. States could
encourage innovation in this regard by awarding grants to help
establish new programs designed to provide long-term solutions to
homelessness, such as more affordable housing and livable wages.
Homelessness is not going away by itself and criminalization is a
quick fix that does nothing to address the underlying causes of
homelessness. American cities must cure the disease, not just cover
the symptoms.
Andrew J. Liese*

251. See Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1965) (stating that a vagrancy
statute should not be applied to "[i]nnocent victims of misfortune" who appear to be vagrants,
but "who are not such either by choice or intentional conduct"); Parker v. Mun. Judge of Las
Vegas, 427 P.2d 642, 644 (Nev. 1967) ("It is simply not a crime to be unemployed, without funds,
and in a public place. To punish the unfortunate for this circumstance debases society."); Alegata
v. Commonwealth, 231 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Mass. 1967) ("Idleness and poverty should not be
treated as a criminal offence.").
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